Aug 20, 1997 · Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem. The entry that follows is divided into thirteen sections. The first distinguishes various uses of the term ‘qualia’. The second addresses …

Sep 3, 2002 · Until some time ago Jackson was one of the very few philosophers who embraced epiphenomenalism. But Jackson changed his mind. Jackson (1995) argues that knowledge about …

Nov 10, 2004 · Section 1 explains what “qualia” are supposed to be. Section 2 describes the many different sorts of “inverted qualia” (specifically, “inverted spectrum”) thought experiments, including a …

Jan 18, 1999 · (A) The first goes by many names, e.g., phenomenal experiences, occurrences of qualitative consciousness, the what-it-is-like of experience, qualia. Pains, afterimages, and tastes …

Jun 18, 2004 · Qualitative states. States might also be regarded as conscious in a seemingly quite different and more qualitative sense. That is, one might count a state as conscious just if it has or …

Aug 20, 1997 · Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem. The entry that follows is divided into ten sections. The first distinguishes various uses of the term ‘qualia’. The second addresses the …

Aug 20, 1997 · In a second, more restricted sense of the term qualia , then, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, non-intentional features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal …

Sep 8, 2003 · (Roughly, qualia are the properties by which we classify experiences according to ‘what they are like’: what it is like to smell roasting coffee beans, for example. Even physicalists can use …

Jul 10, 2009 · Loar, Brian, 2002, “Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia”, in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, A. Jokic and Q. Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford …

Mar 8, 2005 · When used in a broad way, “qualia” picks out whatever qualities a state of mind has which constitute the state of mind’s having the phenomenal character it has.